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TIME: Almanac 1990
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1990 Time Magazine Compact Almanac, The (1991)(Time).iso
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102389
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10238900.050
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1990-09-22
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NATION, Page 40Sources of the Strongman's Strength
Noriega's ability to hang on in the face of fierce opposition
from the U.S. stems mainly from his tactic of buying or winning the
support of a handful of key officers within the military. He has
convinced some leaders of the 17,000-strong Panama Defense Forces
of two dubious propositions: first, that the country's political
opposition will eviscerate the PDF if it comes to power; second,
that he alone represents the military's best interests. The
soldiers, says a foreign diplomat, "view Noriega as the keystone
in an arch; without him the arch will crumble."
The general also has a significant civilian power base among
Panama's nonwhite majority. It stems from his image as the
protector of la revolucion, the shift in political power led by
Omar Torrijos Herrera, who seized control of the military in a coup
21 years ago. A cholo (a Spanish-American Indian), Torrijos gave
fellow cholos, blacks, Chinese and other nonwhites new influence,
both within the military and in the government. This broke the
traditional monopoly held by the country's wealthy class of
European descendants.
Under Torrijos, the Democratic Revolutionary Party (P.R.D.)
became a vehicle through which once powerless nonwhites exerted new
political influence. The party, in turn, benefited from its tight
relationship with the PDF, which dispensed patronage favors. Thus,
when the U.S. demands Noriega's resignation, it steps into Panama's
complex mix of race and class politics. "This is a battle that is
much larger than Noriega," says a senior official of the P.R.D.
"Bush's people say they have no quarrel with the military. The
problem is that the old-line oligarchs would use Noriega's
expulsion as a chance to take back what they lost. This is what
makes this a war for us."
Within the military, Noriega too has played the race issue
shrewdly, promoting nonwhite officers and giving the predominantly
nonwhite enlisted ranks new perks. He has traditionally stocked the
post exchanges with ample and affordable consumer goods and
protected the pay of enlisted men against U.S. economic sanctions.
But as the angry general now wreaks revenge on his military foes,
he runs the danger of straining the old loyalties. The distrust,
hatred and fear injected into the army are a potentially
combustible mix.